Curriculum Vitae
Josef Göppel
Josef Göppel was born on 16 August 1950 on a small farm in the Franconian village of Rauenzell near Ansbach. He grew up with a strong attachment to the land and became a forester. He worked as a forestry engineer for 28 years – mostly outdoors. Göppel is married and has four daughters.
In 1972, he became involved in the local politics of his home region. After eight years in the Bavarian State Parliament, he was elected directly to the German Bundestag in 2002. All his political activities focus on living and working in harmony with nature.
Göppel has been the head of the CSU’s environmental working group since 1991, and has played a significant role in shaping the party’s environmental platform. Within the party, he has a reputation as a sometimes difficult and persistent unconventional thinker. The media regard him as the green conscience of his party.
As a forestry engineer, in 1986 he founded the Land Care Association of Middle Franconia. His aim was to overcome the bitter divisions that existed at that time between environmentalists and farmers. The initiative became a success, and today there are 155 Land Care Associations in 14 German Länder, with equal representation of farmers, conservationists and local politicians. Göppel has been head of the German Association for Landcare since 1993. The network Landcare Europe was founded at EU level in 2016.
In the mid-90s he joined the International Eco-Social Forum and worked on the Global Marshall Plan Initiative.
In 2005 he founded the Renewable Energies Network in the Middle Franconia region together with business representatives, craftspeople and scientists. In 2014 this led to the creation of the Franconia Regional Electricity cooperative, which aims to sell electricity directly to those in the immediate vicinity of the production sites.
He stood firmly by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel in 2015, when her generous policy of receiving Syrian refugees came under harsh criticism from the CDU and CSU.
A key cross-party initiative in the German Bundestag can be traced back to Göppel: members of government and opposition parties joined forces in the Future Forum on the Environment, where they made the case for more sustainable environmental policies.
In the Bundestag elections, Göppel’s personal votes have far surpassed the second votes for his party every time; in 2013, the figures stood at 53.3 percent to 47.6 percent.
An outsider’s view proves revealing – the following text appeared in the local press after an appearance at the Nürnberger Presseclub:
"Göppel is a true conservative. He wants nothing more than to preserve creation. The CSU Member of the Bundestag approaches politics through the lenses of his Christian faith and his long experience working with nature. He has been known to get on the wrong side of people, whether it be his fellow party members or supporters of conventional growth policies. He was the only member of the CSU to vote against generating electricity from nuclear power in Germany long before the start of the energy transition."
Political Career
•1972-2004 Herrieden town council
•1974-1994 Middle Franconia District Council
•since 1991 Chairman of the CSU environmental working group
•1986 founded the first Land Care Association
•1994-2002 Bavarian State Parliament
•since 1996 Ansbach county council
•since 2002 German Bundestag
The Philosophy of Power Marketing Expressed in the Draft of the New Renewable Energy Sources Act
Josef Göppel, Member of the German Bundestag
Dr. Andreas Lenz, Member of the German Bundestag
Florian Post, Member of the German Bundestag
31 March 2014
The Philosophy of Power Marketing Expressed in the Draft of the New Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG)
The modification of the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG) equalisation scheme as of 1 January 2010 with the move from the physical distribution of renewable power to the purely financial distribution of the costs incurred under the EEG has resulted in the ‘green’ attributes of EEG-funded power being lost. Since then, power from renewable energies has no longer been supplied to the ultimate consumers who fund it through the surcharges imposed by the EEG apportionment mechanism, and those consumers have not had an immediate obligation to purchase this power. Following the modification of the equalisation scheme, the volume of EEG-funded power sold on the power exchange has become power of “unknown origin”. Direct marketers may no longer sell power that has been subsidised using the market premium as “green power” because this would mean they benefitted twice from their products’ designation as having the attributes of green power. The ruling out of this “double designation” is intended to prevent distortions on the green power market. Otherwise, unsubsidised Green power from other countries would be at a disadvantage compared to power that had already been subsidised sufficiently by means of the market premium. Such a distortion of competition would be impermissible under European law.
In summary, therefore, the proposed new EEG expresses the following philosophy: The EEG surcharge results in ecopower making up a certain proportion of the power purchased by all consumers. They have funded the power paid for with the EEG tariffs, and it therefore may not be sold once again as green power. Apart from this, Austrian hydropower, for example, would then be unable to compete with power subsidised under the EEG.
European Commission views the matter differently
Ever more people in Germany find it incomprehensible that renewable power is transformed into ‘power of unknown origin’ as soon as it is fed into the grid, even if it demonstrably comes from the local wind turbine or a consumer’s own solar panels. It is sound common sense that the attributes of green power are always associated with the fact that the power originates from a particular generating facility.
The European Commission has classified the EEG as state aid since 2010 because physical distribution with ‘obligations to purchase power from renewable energy sources’ has been replaced by a system of surcharges that ‘is not tied to the purchase of power from renewable energies.’ (Invitation to submit comments issued to the Federal Republic of Germany, para. 149, 18 December 2014, OJ C, 7 February 2014.)
The alternative: another marketing channel
The draft of the 2014 EEG relies wholly on the market premium as an instrument to promote power funded under the EEG. The market premium compensates for the difference between the price on the power exchanges and the tariffs paid under the EEG. This system is called direct marketing, but there is not actually anything direct about it. Wholesalers place renewable power on the exchange. End customers receive an anonymous mix of fossil and renewable power. The spot market continues to suffer from oversupply. This approach will not break the spiral of rising surcharges. The coalition will have to explain new negative headlines every year.
The neatest way to get out of both the financial dilemma and the dilemma posed by EU law would be the physical distribution of renewable power among the regional power retailers in accordance with their market shares.
If no majority is found for this solution, the option that would remain as a way out within the current system would be the development of a supplementary form of direct marketing that would facilitate direct customer relationships between generators and ultimate consumers, at the same time as permitting the attributes of ecopower to be exploited. It would remain to be seen whether the European Commission would then cease to classify the EEG as state aid. In any event, however, it would markedly reduce the tensions surrounding the negotiations with Brussels!
The concrete marketing channel (ecopower market model) could take the following shape:
The market premium would be applied in the customary way but, in return for retaining the attributes of green power, marketers would pay a levy to the EEG account that would be markedly higher than the average exchange price for green power certificates. This would prevent any distortion of competition in relation to the trading of green power with neighbouring European states and ensure compliance with the double subsidy prohibition (= prohibition of multiple sale). The generator would purchase back the attributes of ecopower they had lost as a result of the granting of the market premium. A handsome mark-up could then be charged for green power from the surrounding region when it was sold on the market. Under this model, marketers would not just trade power, but feed it into the part of the grid controlled by their energy balance group and supply it all the way to the end customer. The direct contractual relationship between generators and end customer marketers would make the management of fluctuations part of both parties’ core business. In consequence, generators too would have to assume responsibility for assuring the supply of power to the end customer at all times.
This proposal would make it possible for the anonymous market to be supplemented by putting in place a concrete market with a large number of actors. A comparison with the direct marketing of foodstuffs will clarify how the different elements of the system would fit together.
a) A farmer initially consumes a proportion of what they produce in their own family (consumption of own power).
b) They sell another proportion of it in their farm shop to people who travel to visit this outlet (delivery via a dedicated power line without contact with the public power grid)
c) Finally, the farmer has a stall at the weekly market in the nearest town (direct sale under the ecopower market model). They see their customers, and their customers are familiar with them as a producer.
d) They supply the last proportion of their produce to a wholesaler. The wholesaler combines products from various suppliers. The end customer purchases them in supermarkets (‘direct marketing’ under the draft EEG).
The most important advantages of the proposal once again:
1. The burden imposed by the EEG surcharge would be reduced in real terms.
2. The price on the power exchange would be stabilised.
3. It would be possible for ecopower from other EU Member States to compete on a completely level playing field – a significant argument for the negotiations with the Commission.
4. The market integration of renewable power would be speeded up by numerous regional solutions.